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After an expansionary monetary policy shock employment increases
and unemployment falls. In standard New Keynesian models the fall
in aggregate unemployment does not a⁄ect employed workers at all.
However, L￿chinger, Meier and Stutzer (2010) found that the risk of
unemployment negatively a⁄ects utility of employed workers: An in-
creases in aggregate unemployment decreases workers￿subjective well-
being, which can be explained by an increased risk of becoming un-
employed. I take account of this e⁄ect in an otherwise standard New
Keynesian open economy model with unemployment as in Gal￿ (2010)
and ￿nd two important results with respect to expansionary monetary
policy shocks: First, the usual wealth e⁄ect in New Keynesian models
of a declining labor force, which is at odds with the data as high-
lighted by Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010), is shut down.
Second, the welfare e⁄ects of such shocks improve considerably, mod-
ifying the standard results of the open economy literature that set o⁄
with Obstfeld and Rogo⁄￿ s (1995) redux model.
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11 Introduction
When a central bank embarks on an expansionary monetary policy, it does
so to stimulate the domestic economy and reduce unemployment: A reduced
real rate of interest results in an increase in output and employment while un-
employment falls. The main motivation for such a policy stance is a societal
preference for low levels of unemployment which entails both considerable
psychological and ￿scal costs. The psychological costs are borne mainly by
the unemployed but also by those who still have a job as was shown with Ger-
man, European and US data by L￿chinger, Meier and Stutzer (2010; LMS
henceforth). In this paper I will shed light on two implications of this psycho-
logical e⁄ect of unemployment when introduced into an otherwise standard
New-Keynesian open economy business cycle model. The ￿rst implication is
the reaction of the labor force to expansionary monetary policy shocks. Stan-
dard New Keynesian models fail to replicate the stylized fact of an increase in
labor market participation in response to monetary or other demand shocks
while the modi￿ed model presented here can explain it. The second impli-
cation is the welfare e⁄ect of monetary policy shocks in the tradition of the
Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(1995) open economy redux model. The modi￿ed model
allows for considerable welfare improvements relative to those in standard
models.
The psychological e⁄ects of unemployment are introduced as a negative
externality of aggregate unemployment on workers￿well-being. The aggre-
gate unemployment rate is related to workers￿disutility from work, acting
as an endogenous preference shifter that reduces disutility of work when
unemployment falls. This modi￿cation of an otherwise standard utility func-
tion is motivated by the ￿nding in LMS that an increase in unemployment
negatively a⁄ects the subjective well-being of people who still have a job.
LMS explain this, inter alia, by an increase in currently employed workers￿
perception of themself being a⁄ected by unemployment in the future. Unem-
ployment thus exerts insecurity in the workplace and thereby reduces utility
of those workers who are currently employed. Furthermore, workers who
want to be employed, i.e. those who are unemployed and those consider-
ing to participate in the labor market or not, are a⁄ected by the preference
shifter as well.
The modi￿ed utility implies that the labor force, and not only employ-
ment, increases after an expansionary monetary policy shock. This is a styl-
ized fact highlighted by Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010; CTW
henceforth) and which is at odds with predictions of standard New Keyne-
sian models where the wealth e⁄ect both increases consumption and desired
leisure thus decreasing the labor force. The intuition for the positive correla-
2tion between employment and the labor force in the model presented below is
as follows: The lower real interest rate after the shock induces an increase in
consumption and employment and a decrease in unemployment.1 The lower
unemployment rate, in turn, reduces the disutility from work for any given
level of employment which increases the incentive to join the labor force.
In other words, the labor force grows when unemployment falls. The usual
wealth e⁄ect that increases consumption and reduces the supply of labor af-
ter an expansionary monetary policy shock which caused the standard New
Keynesian models￿failure to replicate the stylized fact is simply shut down.
CTW, Gal￿ (2011) and Gal￿, Smets and Wouters (2011) addressed this
problem in closed-economy frameworks in di⁄erent ways. CTW assume in-
complete risk sharing in consumption and search e⁄ort needed to ￿nd a job
such that an unemployed worker is always worse o⁄than an employed worker.
As a result, an expansionary monetary policy shock induces inactive workers
to join the labor force as demand for labor increases and thereby the ex-
pected utility of being in the labor force rather than out of it. Gal￿ (2011)
and Gal￿ et al. (2011) shut down the wealth e⁄ect by employing a preference
shifter that is determined by the deviation of aggregate consumption from its
long-run growth path. This approach is, of course, closely related to the one
pursued in this paper as a fall in unemployment is correlated with an increase
in aggregate consumption. However, the reasoning above of a psychological
e⁄ect of aggregate unemployment on individual well-being following LMS
provides a reasonable microfoundation for a modi￿cation of utility.
The second implication relates to the open economy dimension of the
model and the normative implications of monetary policy shocks. With un-
employment a⁄ecting utility directly, the welfare e⁄ects of monetary policy
change considerably compared to prior research. In particular, I show that in
this model the welfare e⁄ects are much more bene￿cial than in previous work
and even changing signs for reasonable calibrations. This work is now brie￿ y
summarized as it provides the reference point for the following analysis.
Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(1995) showed that when the elasticity of substitution
between domestically produced goods (henceforth the within-country substi-
tutability) equals the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods (henceforth the cross-country substitutability), utility (i.e. welfare)
increases after an expansionary monetary policy shock both for the domes-
tic and the foreign representative household. The welfare measure employed
was the discounted present value of utility changes after the shock. Corsetti
and Pesenti (2001) and Tille (2001) showed that this result is not robust
to calibrations where the cross-country substitutability is lower than the
1I will motivate the e⁄ect on employment, rather than hours worked per worker, below.
3within-country substitutability. Domestic welfare falls while foreign welfare
increases implying a beggar-thyself e⁄ect of monetary policy shocks.
These last results with respect to welfare are due to the interaction of
short-run and long-run e⁄ects of the shock and these are changed by the
modi￿ed utility. In the standard model, a high cross-country substitutability
implies a strong positive reaction of output in the short-run due to a strong
expenditure switching e⁄ect which increases disutility of work and resulting in
a short-run fall in utility. As capital markets are integrated but incomplete,
the export revenues that are temporarily higher than in the steady state
imply a permanent transfer of wealth in favor of the domestic economy. In the
new steady state this allows higher consumption and less hours of work than
in the original steady state, long-run welfare thus increases which dominates
the short-run e⁄ect in Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995). When the cross-country
substitutability is reduced, both the short-run and the long-run e⁄ects are
reduced. Engler and Tervala (2011) showed that the negative short-run e⁄ect
does not change sign while the long-run e⁄ect turns negative for a cross-
country substitutability of smaller than one. As households discount the long-
run e⁄ects, the short-run negative e⁄ect dominates such that overall welfare
falls for a small cross-country substitutabilities. As unemployment falls when
output increases, in the model presented below, the modi￿ed utility dampens
the short-run negative welfare e⁄ect as the increase in employment is o⁄set
by the positive e⁄ect of reduced unemployment on utility. Overall welfare
therefore increases for all values of the cross-country substitutability.23
The choice of producer currency pricing (PCP), but not local currency
pricing (LCP) practices in this model is motivated by the recent ￿ndings
of Bluedorn and Bowdler (2011). They ￿nd that a US expansion results
in spillover e⁄ects that reduce other G7-countries￿interest rates while for
some of these countries the output responses are positive while for others
they are negative. This last ambiguous e⁄ect can be explained by varying
cross-country substitutabilities. LCP practices, in contrast, would not be in
accordance with these ￿ndings.4
2In New Keynesian closed economy models welfare increases in any case because of the
monopolistically competitive market structure (see, for example Blanchard and Kiyotaki,
1987) so that the modi￿ed utility simply increases the increase in welfare.
3The precise model dynamics would be di⁄erent in a model with multi-stage intra-
industry trade where the cross-country substitutability matters less while direct demand
e⁄ects for intermediate goods imports determine international trade as in Kevin Huang￿ s
and Zheng Li￿ s (2007) paper. I thank Kevin to point this out to me. However, the e⁄ect of
unemployment on utility would still improve the welfare e⁄ect of a monetary policy shock
in the domestic economy while the outcome for the foreign economy would certainly be
similar for a low cross-country substitutability.
4See Tervala (2011) for a discussion of the positive and normative implications of mon-
4Employment, unemployment and ￿ uctuations thereof are introduced as
in Gal￿ (2010). What is usually looked at when accounting for changes in
total hours worked (and, implicitly, job market inactivity) is the change in
total hours per worker. However, economy wide hours can be split up into
changes in the number of hours worked per worker, the intensive margin,
and changes in the number of workers, the extensive margin. At business
cycle frequencies, the latter clearly dominates the ￿rst as was pointed out
by Hansen (1985) for US data and more recently by Merkl and Wesselbaum
(2011) for US and German data. It is thus rather people moving out of leisure
or unemployment into employment than workers changing their number of
hours that drive (as in real business cycle models) or go along with (as in
Keynesian models) the business cycle. When interpreting ￿ uctuations in
total hours as ￿ uctuations of employment, a link can be established between
employment, the labor force and unemployment as was demonstrated by Gal￿
(2010), extending the basic model of Erceg, Henderson and Levine (2000) of
a closed economy. Unemployment is proportional to the wage markup and
￿ uctuations in this markup due to nominal wage rigidities determine the rate
of unemployment. A positive demand shock, like an expansionary monetary
policy shock, then reduces the wage mark-up and the rate of unemployment.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the literature on the link
between unemployment and well-being is brie￿ y introduced. In section 3 I
present a New Keynesian two-country model with price and wage rigidities
that incorporates unemployment as in Gal￿ (2010). Within this framework I
discusses the positive and normative implications of an expansionary mone-
tary policy shock in section 4.
2 Unemployment and well-being
The standard macroeconomic approach to modelling the e⁄ects of labor mar-
ket participation on well-being is to assume that hours worked reduce utility
while aggregate unemployment does not a⁄ect utility at all. However, there
is a large literature on the psychological e⁄ects of unemployment and job
insecurity on well-being. In particular, there is evidence that unemployment
does not only reduce the well-being of the directly a⁄ected but also of people
who still have a job. Oswald (2003), for example, found that subjective well-
being is inversely related to unemployment even after controlling for personal
unemployment. In what follows I brie￿ y shed light on this large literature
on interpersonal spillover e⁄ects of job market experiences.
etary policy shocks under LCP and PCP.
5The most obvious transmission channel of labor market experiences be-
tween individuals is between spouses. McKee and Bell (1986) interviewed un-
employed spouses in the English city of Kidderminster. They found that the
(usually male) breadwinner￿ s unemployment severely a⁄ected their partners￿
state of well-being as unemployment increased the budgetary constraints and
dramatically reduced both partners￿social ties with the outside world, i.e.
outside their own household. But not only unemployment itself has e⁄ects on
partners but also stress in the work place. Jones and Fletcher (1993) showed
for English and Welsh cohabiting couples who worked either full or part-time,
that men￿ s work related stressors a⁄ected measures of their partners￿anxiety
and depression (but not vice versa from women to men). The psychologi-
cal e⁄ects of both employment and unemployment thus have psychological
repercussions within families.
Moreover, ￿job insecurity￿ , i.e. the perception of one￿ s job to become
￿redundant￿ some time in the future, was shown to be an important stres-
sor for employees. Dekker and Schaufeli (1995) showed that job insecurity
a⁄ected workers￿well-being more than the actual redundancy. In the same
vein de Witte (1999) showed in a study of employees of a Belgian plant of
a European multinational company in the metalworking industry that the
well-being of employees is a⁄ected negatively when the perception of losing
one￿ s job increases. This result also holds after controlling both for personal
characteristics like occupational status, gender and age and for job charac-
teristics like workload demands and a measure of skill utilization.
Apart from ￿rm speci￿c reasons determining the perception of job in-
security, another important factor could be other people￿ s unemployment.
When aggregate unemployment rises this could be viewed by employees as
an indication that the likelihood of themselves being laid o⁄ increases. Con-
sequently, unemployment could a⁄ect the perception of job insecurity and
thereby well-being of people who are still employed because income and so-
cial status related to being employed would be lost in case of a layo⁄. The
welfare and utility consequences of unemployment would then go beyond the
directly a⁄ected.
L￿chinger et al. (2011) found evidence for this hypothesis of well-being
being a⁄ected by aggregate unemployment through an e⁄ect on job insecu-
rity with data from the German socio-economic panel (GSOEP). They found
that reported life satisfaction is signi￿cantly and inversely related to regional
unemployment across German states. Moreover, this e⁄ect is strongest for
private sector employees, lower for public sector employees and non-existent
for public servants (￿Beamte￿ ). This can be interpreted as evidence in fa-
vor of the above stated hypothesis of unemployment a⁄ecting job insecurity
because German public servants can hardly be ￿red at all, while job protec-
6tion is stronger for public sector employees than for private sector employees.
These results were con￿rmed with US and European Union data from the
General Social Survey and the Eurobarometer, respectively.
For macroeconomic modelling the question then arises whether these ef-
fects matter if properly taken account of. I will show that the stylized fact
about the reaction of the labor force to monetary policy shocks mentioned in
the introduction can be explained when this is done, in contrast to standard
New Keynesian models. The model ￿t can thus be improved by modify-
ing the utility function. Furthermore I show the welfare consequence of this
modi￿cation for monetary policy shocks in an open economy.
3 The Model
The model is a New-Keynesian, two-country open economy model as in En-
gler and Tervala (2011) but with monopolistic competition in both the goods
and the labor market and price and wage rigidities ￿ la Calvo (1983) as in
Erceg et al. (2000). Furthermore, unemployment is taken account of explic-
itly and determined by the mark-up prevailing in the labor market, i.e. the
degree of monopolistic competition as in Gal￿ (2010). Aggregate unemploy-
ment, in turn, feeds back into private disutility of labor and thereby a⁄ects
the marginal rate of substitution, the labor supply decision and welfare. Cap-
ital markets are fully integrated but this market is incomplete as there is only
trade in a riskless bond. Monetary policy is modelled as a standard Taylor
rule.
3.1 Households
Home and foreign houeseholds determine goods demand functions and Euler
equations given relative prices, the terms of trade, the exchange rate and
a budget constraint while employment is determined by a labor union that
sets wages under monopolistic competition taking account of ￿rms￿labor
demand. Labor supply, in contrast, is determined by the hypothetical allo-
cation under perfect competition in the labor market, given the real wage.
The di⁄erence between the (log) labor supply and (log) employment deter-
mines the unemployment rate.
3.1.1 Preferences and goods demand
The world economy is populated by a continuum of households which in turn
consist of a continuum of members. The fraction 1 ￿ n of these households
7lives in the domestic economy while the remaining fraction n lives in the
foreign country, so the size of the world economy is normalized to 1. Following
Gal￿ (2010), household members are represented by the pairs (i;j) 2 [0;1] ￿
[0;1] where index i represents the type of work an individual is specialized
in and j represents the disutility from work. Each individual either works or
is unemployed. When working, the disutility of work is j’ with ’ > 0 and
zero when he is out of work.
I assume full risk sharing across individuals and households within coun-
tries so that the work status does not a⁄ect the level of consumption. An
implication of this is that I abstract from any e⁄ects of unemployment on
utility beyond its e⁄ect on the disutility from working.
The representative domestic household￿ s objective function is the dis-






with discount factor ￿, rational expectations operator E and period utility
function













where Nt(i) is the fraction of household members with specilization i that is
employed in period t, and ￿t is an endogenous preference shifter de￿ned as
￿t ￿ { exp(ut)
{
where ut is the unemployment rate as de￿ned below, { and { are parameters
determining the strength of the preference in and around the steady state,
respectively. When unemployment falls, the marginal disutility from work
falls. As outlined above, an intuitive explanation for this preference shifter
is that some of the disutility from work derives from workers￿stress implied
by being afraid of losing their jobs because of unemployed workers standing
ready to replace them. When unemployment falls, this stress is reduced and
people feel less disutility at the workplace. Gal￿, Smets and Wouters (2011)
employ a preference shifter that employs a time trend in consumption. There
it is consumption temporarily growing faster than trend in a boom that
induces a lower disutility from work.5 As consumption growth will be strong
5See also Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) for a preference shifter in the context of news
shocks driving the business cycle.
8when unemployment is low, the underlying mechanism is indeed similar.6

























































t (z) and C
f
t (z) are domestically or foreign produced goods z. I
assume no home bias in consumption so that according indexes apply for
the foreign economy. These equations, as most other foreign equations, will
not be shown, however. A standard expenditure-minimization procedure













































































respectively, where P h
t (z) and P
f





6This micro-founded endogenous preference shifter also provides an alternative to the
notion that certain recessions are caused by "a severe attack of contagious laziness", as
Modigliani (1977) described the focus of some authors on an exogenous preference shifter
associated with declinig employment. That the Great Depression in the 1930s, for exam-
ple, was caused by a societal unwillingness to work is indeed implausible. However, an
endogenous increase in disutility because of the increase in unemployment, is quite likely in
light of the evidence presented above. In that case, the causality runs from unemployment
to preferences and not vice versa.
9The law of one price is assumed to hold, so we have
P
h




t (z) = StP
￿f
t (z);
for foreign currency price P ￿h
t (z) of a domestically produced good and P
￿f
t (z)
as the foreign currency price of a foreign produced good and nominal ex-
change rate St expressing the domestic currency in terms of the foreign cur-
rency. Because all goods are tradable and because of the absence of a home
bias in consumption, purchasing power parity holds, i.e. Pt = StP ￿
t for the
foreign consumption price index P ￿
t .
As there are (1 ￿ n) households in the home and n households in the



















t (z) ￿ (1 ￿ n)Ch
t (z) + nC￿h
t (z) is world aggregate demand for good
z with C￿h
t (z) denoting foreign demand for the domestic good and where
CW
t ￿ ((1 ￿ n)Ct + nC￿
t ) is world aggregate consumption. The representa-














t (z)dz = PtCt
3.1.2 The terms of trade and the nominal exchange rate




When approximated around the steady state, this term is proportional to







as an approximation of the consumer price index (2) around a symetric steady
state in which P h = P f can be shown to yield7
b p
h
t ￿ b pt = nb ￿t
Hats over lower case variables denote percent deviations from the respective
steady state values. The link between the terms of trade and the nominal
exchange rate can be established by using the law of one price so that
b ￿t = b p
h
t ￿ b p
￿f
t ￿ b st (4)
7The corresponding equation for the foreign economy is b p￿
t = b p
￿f
t + (1 ￿ n)b ￿t.
10To the extent that prices are sticky, a depreciation of the nominal exchange
rate, i.e. b st > 0, implies a deterioration of the terms of trade, i.e. b ￿t < 0.
3.1.3 Budget Constraints, Euler Equations and interest rate par-
ity
When maximising (1), the household faces the ￿ ow budget constraint
Dt = (1 + it)Dt￿1 +
Z 1
0
Wt(i)Nt(i)di ￿ PtCt + ￿t (5)
where it is the riskless non-state-contingent nominal interest rate of the do-
mestic bond Dt, where ￿t is the household￿ s share in ￿rms￿pro￿ts and where
Wt(i) is the nominal wage that type i workers receive when employed. The
domestic bond is assumed to be traded internationally in a frictionless mar-
ket. Foreign households￿holdings of these bonds are D￿
t so that the market
for the bond clears when
(1 ￿ n)Dt + nD
￿
t = 0










while for the foreign household, when maximising with respect to a foreign

















Because of the integrated market for domestic bonds, domestic and for-
eign nominal interest rates are linked through an interest parity condition
into which a risk premium is incorporated,












where dt is the domestic international investment position relative to steady
state GDP. I assume that in the steady state D = 0 so that the risk premium
is zero in the steady state, too. The risk premium is introduced because
otherwise the steady state would not be unique.8
8A risk premium of this kind was proposed by Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2003) to
113.1.4 Wage setting
As workers are specialized in certain types of work in this model, it is reason-
able to assume that they are not exposed to perfect competition in the labor
market. Following Erceg et al. (2000) and Gal￿ (2010), wage Wt(i) is set by a
labor union representing sector i workers in an environment of monopolistic
competition. Labor input Nt(i), on the other hand, is determined by ￿rms￿
aggregate labor demand decisions and allocated equally across households
within a country. Furthermore, a mechanism ￿ la Calvo (1983) is assumed
according to which wages in a sector can only be reset in a given period with
probability 1 ￿ ￿w that is independent of the time since the last resetting
occurred. This implies that it is optimal for the unions to set wages in a
forward looking manner as they know that with a positive probability they
will have to leave their wage unchanged in a changed future environment.
When deciding about the optimal wage W o
t in period t, unions take as
















which is conditional on the wage decision in period t, as given. Nt+k(z) is ￿rm
z￿ s labor input explained in more details below. The ￿rst order conditions


















where MRSt+kpt = Ct￿tN
’
t+kpt is the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and employment in t+k for workers whose wages were reset in
induce stationarity in a small-open economy model. See also Bergin (2006) for an empirical
assessment and Tervala (2011) for a theoretical application. The reason why the risk
premium ensures uniqueness of the steady state can be seen when we log-linearize the two
Euler equations, subtract one from the other, take account of the purchasing power parity
and the interest parity conditions, to get b ct￿b c￿
t = Et
￿
b ct+1 ￿ b c￿
t+1
￿
+ dt. Without a risk-
premium (i.e.   = 0), temporary changes to the di⁄erence between domestic and foreign
consumption, due to a re-allocation of wealth, would become permanent. Consumption
and other variables would thus follow a random walk, a property that the new open
economy models in the tradition of Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995) possess. An international
investment position and a corresponding risk premium that return to their original steady
states allow the di⁄erence in consumption to fade over time. A technical advantage of the
absence of the random walk property is that it allows the computation of unconditional
moments.









k Et fmrst+kpt + pt+kg (6)
where ￿w = log ￿w
￿w￿1 is the log steady state (and frictionless) wage markup. In
order to relate the wage setting decision in sector i to aggregate developments
one can de￿ne MRSt = Ct￿tN
’
t as the average marginal rate of substitution




mrst+kpt = mrst+k + ’(nt+kpt ￿ nt+k)
= mrst+k ￿ ￿w’(w
o
t ￿ wt+k) (7)
Combining (6) and (7) with the linearized wage index wt = ￿wwt￿1+(1￿
￿w)wo














t = wt ￿ wt￿1 is the nominal wage in￿ ation, where ￿w
t = wt ￿
pt ￿ mrst is the average wage markup and where ￿w =
(1￿￿w)(1￿￿￿w)
￿w(1+￿w’) is the
responsiveness of the wage in￿ ation to wage markup ￿ uctuations.
De￿ning the log real wage as !t ￿ wt ￿ pt, the following identity linking
the real wage and wage and CPI in￿ ation holds:




Following Gal￿ (2010), I now relate the ine¢ ciently low level of employment
that is due to the monopolistic labor market structure to the unemployment
rate. This is done by determining the actual level of employment and the level
of employment that would be observed in a world without monopolistic com-
petition in the labor market. The latter of the two constitutes the aggregate
labor force and the di⁄erence between the two the level of unemployment.






is ful￿lled. For the "marginal supplier" in sector i, denoted as Lt(i), this





13De￿ning the aggregate labor force as Lt =
Z 1
0
Lt(i)di, taking logs and inte-
grating, we get the aggregate labor supply relation








De￿ning the unemployment rate ut as the (log) di⁄erence between the
aggregate labor force and employment,
ut = lt ￿ nt
and using the wage markup equation,
￿
w




t = ’ut (11)
The unemployment rate in period t is thus proportional to the wage markup.
Any decline in the markup, due to a decline in the real wage or an increase
in consumption or employment, will result in a decline in the unemployment
rate as people move out of unemployment into work and out of the labor
force into inactivity. The strength of this e⁄ect is determined inversely by the
parameter ’ which determines the degree of disutility of work. The driving
force of ouput ￿ uctuations in this model are employment ￿ uctuations, i.e. the
extensive margin, and not changes in hours worked per worker, the intensive
margin, as in most standard New Keynesian models. The utility cost of an
increase in output is determined by the disutility of being in work rather than
out of work and not the disutility of reducing leisure to work more hours of
an already employed worker.










￿ ￿w’(ut ￿ u
n) (12)
where un is the natural rate of unemployment suggesting a negative correla-
tion between unemployment ￿ uctuations and wage in￿ ation. This relation-
ship resembles the original Phillips curve (Phillips, 1958) but di⁄ers from it
in that it is microfounded, i.e. its parameters are derived from an optimiza-
tion procedure so that the negative co-movement between unemployment
and wage developments is explicable by economic theory rather than a pure
statistical relationship. Furthermore, the curve is forward looking which was
14also absent in the original formulation of Phillips. Gal￿ (2011) shows that
(12) describes US labor market developments in the time since the mid-1980
and in the post-war period until the early 1970s reasonably well.
The modi￿cation of the utility function a⁄ects the marginal rate of sub-
stitution and thereby the labor supply and employment decisions and conse-
quently the unemployment rate. This can be seen in equations (9) and (10),
respectively and will be discussed below in detail.
3.2 Supply Side: Firms
3.2.1 Pro￿ts and Demand
The continuum of domestic ￿rms is indexed by z 2 [n;1], and produces
output Yt (z) with production function
Yt (z) = Nt (z)
1￿￿ (13)








is the employment index of ￿rm z.







for all i 2 [0;1] and z 2 [n;1]
Firm z period t pro￿ts are
￿t (z) = P
h
t (z)Yt (z) ￿ WtNt (z); (14)
which take account of world demand function (3) and production function
(13).
3.2.2 Price Setting







(1 ￿ ￿)Nt (z)
￿￿
where P ho
t (z) is the optimal price. As this is the same for all ￿rms resetting







15with average marginal cost function ￿t = Wt
(1￿￿)Nt￿￿.
If, instead, price setting is ￿ la Calvo, with price stickiness parameter ￿p,
















is the household￿ s discount factor and the













where  t+kpt = log￿t+kpt is the log marginal cost function in period t + k of
those ￿rms that reset their price in period t and that have not reset the price
between t and t+k and where ￿p ￿ log ￿
￿￿1 is the optimal log price markup.
3.2.3 Aggregate prices
Next we relate ￿rm speci￿c marginal costs  t+kpt to average marginal costs
in order to derive an aggregate in￿ ation equation. Using the approximate
production relationship yt = (1 ￿ ￿)nt, that will be derived below, we can
write
 t+kpt =  t+k + ￿(nt+kpt ￿ nt+k)
and because
yt+kpt ￿ yt+k = (1 ￿ ￿)(nt+kpt ￿ nt+k)
we get




The term in brackets can be related to the relative price of the non-adjusting
￿rm prices and average domestic prices (the derivation is presented in the
appendix),
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can be derived, with domestic in￿ ation ￿h
t ￿ ph
t ￿ph










Central bank behavior is described by the following Taylor-type rule
[ 1 + it = ￿i \ 1 + it￿1 + ￿￿￿
h
t + ￿yb yt + ￿w￿
w
t + "t
with monetary policy shock "t that follows a white noise process. The reason
for choosing the domestic in￿ ation rate rather than the CPI-in￿ ation is that
in an open economy, the output dispersion due to staggered price setting is
proportional to domestic prices rather than the CPI so that the implied inef-
￿ciency will be reduced when the central bank reacts to changes in ￿h
t rather
than in ￿t. This rule abstracts, however, from any reactions to ￿ uctuations
in the exchange rate or the terms of trade. The reaction to wage in￿ ation is
motivated by the improved stabilization performance as highlighted by Erceg
et al. (2000).
3.4 Symmetric Equilibrium
The conditions for a symmetric equilibrium are obtained by aggregating in-
dividual demand functions to an aggregate one and individual employments
to an aggregate employment index allowing the determination of an aggre-
gate approximate production function. Furthermore, the aggregate resource
constraint determines the international investment position.
173.4.1 Aggregate demand


















we get an aggregate demand relationship by plugging in the aggregate good










This implies that in a symmetric steady state with C = C￿ we have Y =
C so that around the steady state, the aggregate demand relationship is
approximately






t ￿ b pt
￿
(16)
b yt = b c
W
t ￿ ￿nb ￿t
Because for the foreign country the corresponding equation is
b y
￿
t = b c
W
t + ￿(1 ￿ n)b ￿t
the di⁄erence between domestic and foreign output is proportional to the
terms of trade:
b yt ￿ b y
￿
t = ￿￿b ￿t
A deterioration of the domestic terms of trade, i.e. ￿t < 0, results in a posi-
tive output di⁄erential vis-￿-vis the foreign country so that an expansionary
monetary policy shock that depreciates the domestic exchange rate reallo-
cates production towards the domestic economy as it induces a consumption
switching e⁄ect, the size of which is determined by the cross-country elastic-
ity of substitution ￿.
183.4.2 Aggregate production and markups
Aggregation of labor input N t(i;z) over all ￿rms and types results in the































































ment and output dispersion that are due to the wage and price rigidities.9
Gal￿ (2010) showed that ￿ uctuations of ￿w
t are of second order, i.e. that
up to a ￿rst order approximation this term is zero. The same is shown for ￿
p
t
in the appendix so that we can derive the approximate aggregate production
function
yt = (1 ￿ ￿)nt













t ￿ pt) ￿ (wt ￿ pt) ￿ ￿nt + log(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
p
= n￿t ￿ !t ￿ ￿nt + log(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
p
Noting that log(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿p equals !t + ￿nt in the steady state, we get
b ￿
p




For the wage mark-up we have accordingly
b ￿
w
t = !t ￿ d mrst
= !t ￿ b ct ￿ {b ut ￿ ’b nt
9For the fourth equality note that the production function can be re-arranged to get
Nt(z) = Yt(z)1=(1￿￿) = (Yt(z)Yt=Yt)1=(1￿￿).
193.4.3 International Investment Position
The aggregate resource constraint determines the domestic economy￿ s inter-
national investment position Dt, which follows from (5) and (14):
Dt = (1 + it)Dt￿1 + P
h
t Yt ￿ PtCt
In an initial steady state that is symmetric across countries with D = 0,
we have Y = C, and accordingly for the foreign country Y ￿ = C￿. Setting
Y = Y ￿ and normalizing the initial price levels such that it equals one,
around the steady state we have approximately10
b ct = ￿dt + ￿
￿1dt￿1 + b yt + nb ￿t
3.4.4 Steady state
From the price and wage setting equations and the aggregate resource con-





















The volumes of output and employment in the steady state are thus an
inverse function of the degree of monopolistic distortion in the goods and the
labor market and the concavity of the production function. Furthermore, the
modi￿cation of the disutility of labor function ({ > 0) reduces the steady
state output and employment as an increase in unemployment increases the
disutility from work implying a reduction in the supply of labor. The constant
{￿1 can o⁄set this e⁄ect if parameterized accordingly. The steady state
ine¢ ciencies in the goods and labor markets and unemployment drive the
welfare implications of monetary policy shocks as discussed below.
3.5 Calibration
The calibration follows mainly that of Engler and Tervala (2011) for the
open economy variables and Gal￿ (2010) for the domestic variables. ￿ is set






t ￿(1￿n)b ￿t, one obtains the international aggregate resource constraint (1 ￿ n)b ct+nb c￿
t =
(1 ￿ n)b yt + nb y￿
t.
20to 0.99 implying a steady state annual interest rate of roughly 4 percent when
regarding periods as quarters. For ￿ and ￿ I choose a value of nine and 0:25,
respectively, so that the steady state labor share, W
P
N





equals 67 percent and the markup 12.5 percent. The degree of price and wage
rigidity, ￿p and ￿w, is 0:75 implying price and wage adjustments after four
quarters on average. Setting the steady state unemployment rate to 5 percent
and the Frisch elasticity, i.e. ’￿1 to 0.2 implicitly determines the degree of
the monopolistic distortion in the labor market (because ￿w = ’u) for which
￿w = 4:52 follows. ￿, the cross-country substitution elasticity, is set to values
in the range of 0.5 and 6 as in Engler and Tervala (2011). The coe¢ cients of
the Taylor rule are ￿i = 0:9, ￿￿ = 1:5 and ￿y = ￿w = 0:125. The coe¢ cient
determining the risk premium,  , is set to 0.003, which is roughly in line with
the value reported by Bergin (2006). { is chosen to exactly o⁄set the e⁄ect of
unemployment on steady state output, i.e. { = (exp(u)
{)
￿1 in order to make
the dynamics comparable to the benchmark model without the modi￿cation
of the utility function. { is set to 2.3 as this roughly allows the replication
of the relative response of the labor force and the unemployment rate in
response to the monetary policy shock as shown by CTW.
4 Monetary Policy Shocks
Figures 1-3 present the impulse responses to a negative shock to the central
bank￿ s target rate both for a model with (denoted as "w") the modi￿ed utility
function and the benchmark without (denoted as "w/o") this modi￿cation,
i.e. the standard New Keynesian model for three values of the cross-country
substitutability ￿ (3, 1 and 0.5 respectively). These positive dynamics are
discussed in Section 4.1, ￿rst for the benchmark model and then for the
model with the modi￿ed utility function.
The normative implications are discussed in Section 4.2, again ￿rst for
the benchmark model and then for the model with modi￿ed utility. The
welfare metrics employed are the change in period utility due to the shock
and the discounted present value of these changes. Taking a ￿rst order Tay-
lor expansion to the representative household￿ s utility function, this utility
change can be shown to be approximately11:
dVt = b ct ￿ {
N1+’
1 + ’
b ut ￿ N
1+’ b nt
11This approach has been followed by Ganelli and Tervala (2010) and Tervala (2010)
and Engler and Tervala (2010).
21This perspective thus tracks the e⁄ects of a shock on period-by-period
utility allowing an assessment of the evolution of these e⁄ects over time. The
new open economy macroeconomic literature in the tradition of Obstfeld
and Rogo⁄ (1995) employed a di⁄erent, but closely related welfare metric,














b ct ￿ {
N1+’
1 + ’
b ut ￿ N
1+’ b nt
￿
which describes the total e⁄ect of a shock on welfare. Both concepts are
reasonable for policy analysis and they should be regarded as complements
rather than substitutes as they highlight two important dimensions of welfare
e⁄ects of policy shocks. Table 1 reports the welfare e⁄ects for the latter metric
and the e⁄ects on period welfare on impact, i.e. dV1 where t = 1 is the shock
period.
4.1 Positive Analysis
4.1.1 The Benchmark model
The domestic monetary policy shock ceteris paribus pushes the domestic
interest rate below its steady state value reducing the real rate of interest
both domestically and abroad because domestic and foreign rates are linked
through the uncovered interest parity condition and because goods prices are
sticky. Aggregate demand for both home and foreign ￿rms increases after
the decrease of the real interest rates as households substitute tomorrow￿ s
for today￿ s consumption. I denote this the real interest rate e⁄ect which is
present also in closed economy settings. Firms hire more workers to meet this
extra demand, they accomplish this by paying higher wages, boosting both
wage in￿ ation (￿w





to the extent that this is
possible, given the assumed price and wage rigidities. This, in turn, partially
reverses the reduction of the interest rate as the central bank endogenously
reacts to price and wage in￿ ation.
A second e⁄ect works through the terms if trade. The change of the
exchange rate can be seen when we log-linearize the uncovered interest rate
condition, solve forward and note that b s1 = 0. Then we get




\ 1 + it+i ￿ \ 1 + i￿
t+i +  dt+i
￿
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Terms of trade w/o
Terms of trade w
Net foreign assets w/o
Net foreign assets w





0.1 Dom. Real Wage w/o
Dom. Real Wage w/
For. Real Wage w/o
For. Real Wage w/
Figure 1: Monetary policy shock, ￿ = 3
When the monetary policy shock induces a fall of the domestic interest
rate below the foreign one for some time and/or improves the international
investment position (i.e. dt > 0), this tends to depreciate the nominal ex-
change rate. This is what happens in the present model. As goods prices are
sticky, the terms of trade will deteriorate (in the present model this implies
a decline in ￿, i.e. b ￿t < 0; see equation (4)) and as long as domestic and
foreign goods are (imperfect) substitutes, relative demand will shift away
from foreign goods and towards domestic goods. This expenditure switching
e⁄ect implies an increase in demand for domestic goods beyond the increase
in domestic demand while the opposite occurs abroad.
From the expenditure switching e⁄ect two e⁄ects follow: First, the do-
mestic disutility of labor e⁄ort further increases as employment increases.
Exactly the opposite happens in the foreign economy where the employment
increase due to the real interest rate e⁄ect is reversed. Second, ￿rms￿rev-
enues increase relative to foreign ￿rms￿revenues when the Marshall-Lerner-
Robinson condition is ful￿lled, as this implies that the decline in the relative
price of domestic ￿rms (the terms of trade) is more than compensated by the
increase in relative output. Tille (2001) showed that the Marshall-Lerner-
Robinson condition is ful￿lled for ￿ > 1. There is thus an improvement
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Figure 2: Monetary policy shock, ￿ = 1
of the international investment position vis-￿-vis the foreign economy (the
current account e⁄ect) in that case, dt increases. Households will smooth
the additional consumption that the additional income a⁄ords. As a con-
sequence, the short run relative increase in output and employment on the
one hand and consumption on the other hand increases relative to the closed
economy scenario. For ￿ > 1, in contrast, the relative domestic revenues fall,
deteriorating the international investment position (dt < 0).
The changes in employment are achieved both through ￿ ows in and out
of unemployment and through ￿ ows in and out of the labor force. Equa-
tion (10) determines the substitution of the marginal worker into a job while
equation (9) determines entry and exit into and out of the labor market
for the marginal worker who is indi⁄erent between inactivity and joining
the labor force. In the benchmark model where { = 0, a monetary policy
shock increases consumption while a⁄ecting the real wage only slightly due
to staggered wages and prices. This reduces the labor force because house-
holds prefer both more consumption and more leisure as both are normal
goods. This is commonly referred to as the wealth e⁄ect in the literature.
Employment, on the other hand, increases as the wage markup is suppressed.
Unemployment falls because both e⁄ects work in the same direction.
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Figure 3: Monetary policy shock, ￿ = 0:5
4.1.2 The Modi￿ed Utility Model
When the utility function is modi￿ed to take account of the feedback e⁄ect
from aggregate unemployment on the disutility of labor, the labor market
dynamics are signi￿cantly altered. In this case, the wealth e⁄ect no longer
needs to be at play: The fall in the rate of unemployment reduces the disu-
tility of labor and the marginal rate of substitution of the worker who is
indi⁄erent between participation and inactivity (equation 9). As a conse-
quence, the labor force can increase if appropriately parameterized (i.e. {
being large enough) and the labor force and employment are positively cor-
related in response to monetary policy shocks. This is in stark contrast to
the benchmark model in which the wealth e⁄ect implies the opposite sign of
the labor supply change and which is at odds with the stylized fact presented
by CTW.
The muted response of the marginal rate of substitution results in a re-
duced real wage compared to the benchmark model allowing for a bigger
increase in employment as workers￿perceived risk of losing their jobs falls.
Output and consumption increase too, although all these e⁄ects are rather
small. The net e⁄ect of the increase in employment and the increased la-
bor force on the rate of unemployment depends on the relative size of the
two e⁄ects. As the latter clearly dominates the ￿rst, unemployment falls less
25compared to the benchmark case. In the foreign economy the e⁄ect on output
and consumption is hardly visible, while the labor supply and unemployment
responses are muted.
Summing up, the modi￿cation of the utility function a⁄ects the response
of the labor force and the rate of unemployment signi￿cantly while leaving
employment and output relatively unaltered.
4.2 Normative Analysis
The normative implications of these impulse responses for both the bench-
mark model and the model with modi￿ed utility are illustrated by the welfare
metrics mentioned above. The period utility changes for three parameteri-
zations are displayed in the ￿rst graphs in Figures 1-3 while the ￿rst period
changes and the discounted presented value (DPV) in welfare are displayed
in Table 1.
￿ = 0:5 ￿ = 1 ￿ = 1:5 ￿ = 3 ￿ = 6
dV1(w=o) -0.040 -0.065 -0.086 -0.133 -0.189
dV1(w) -0.051 -0.040 -0.029 -0.001 -0.032
dV ￿
1 (w=o) 0.156 0.181 0.202 0.249 0.305
dV ￿
1 (w) 0.176 0.186 0.198 0.226 0.260
dV DPV
t (w=o) -0.490 -0.148 -0.019 0.125 0.211
dV DPV
t (w) -0.311 -0.079 0.227 0.396 0.498
dV ￿DPV
t (w=o) 0.754 0.412 0.283 0.138 0.052
dV DPV
t (w) 0.837 0.447 0.299 0.129 0.027
Table 1: Welfare e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks
4.2.1 The Benchmark Model
Engler and Tervala (2011) show that even for a scenario in which the Marshall-
Lerner-Robinson condition is not ful￿lled, the short-run welfare e⁄ect of an
expansionary monetary policy shock is negative. i.e. that the increase in
disutility from labor is larger than the increase in consumption utility. This
26means than irrespective of the size of the substitution elasticity between do-
mestically and foreign produced goods, an expansionary monetary policy is
beggar-thyself in the short-run.
The short-run beggar-thyself e⁄ect can be seen in Table 1, where domestic
welfare falls immediately after the shock while foreign welfare increases. The
increase in domestic employment is larger than the increase in consumption
while foreign employment falls. The net e⁄ect on domestic welfare is negative,
even though the coe¢ cient on the ￿rst, N1+’, is roughly 0.5, weakening the
impact of the increase in employment signi￿cantly. The welfare e⁄ect for the
foreign economy is clearly positive as consumption increases and employment
falls. The expenditure-switching e⁄ect thus has a powerful implication for
short-run welfare in open economies.
In the long run these e⁄ects can change, however. In case of a permanent
wealth reallocation in favor of the domestic economy which occurs for ￿ > 1,
as is the case in the models of Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995) and Engler and
Tervala (2011) which possess the random walk property discussed above,
households can a⁄ord a higher level of consumption and a lower level of hours
as they receive a permanent stream of interest payments from the foreign
country in the new steady state. Monetary policy is beggar-thy-neighbor in
the long run in these models.
Here, however, the long-run equilibrium is the same steady state as the
old one, so that we can only look at the "medium run", the time between
the quarters immediately after the shock and the new/old steady state. In
the case of an initial improvement of the international investment position
when ￿ > 1, domestic welfare turns positive in the medium-run because
households smooth the reduction of consumption towards the steady state
while employment falls (although this e⁄ect is hardly visible in the graph for
small values of ￿). They accomplish this by driving down their international
investment position that they had built up in the ￿rst quarters after the
shock. The foreign country pays back its debt by reducing consumption
below and increasing employment and the labor force above the steady state
levels. When ￿ < 1, the international investment position falls initially and
the domestic economy needs to keep consumption low enough to repay this
debt thereby keeping the sign of the e⁄ect on welfare negative in the medium-
run.
Consequently, monetary policy shocks are beggar-thy-neighbor in the
medium-run in the benchmark model for ￿ > 1 and beggar-thyself for ￿ < 1.
The discounted present values of these period utility changes can be read
o⁄ the bottom part of Table 1. For ￿ < 1 both the short-run and the
medium-run e⁄ects are negative so that the overall welfare e⁄ect is negative.
Increasing the value of ￿ increases the initial negative impact as the expendi-
27ture switching e⁄ect increases employment, but it also increases the current
account e⁄ect which improves the impact in the medium term. The second
e⁄ect clearly dominates the ￿rst e⁄ect and net impact on the discounted
present value is such that welfare improves in ￿.
The foreign economy gains in terms of welfare, both in the short-run and
in terms of the discounted present discounted value and for all values of ￿.
4.2.2 The Modi￿ed Utility Model
As discussed above, the modi￿cation of the utility function has a large e⁄ect
on the response of the domestic unemployment rate (and the labor force) to
the monetary policy shock while the responses of consumption and employ-
ment change a lot less. However, the unemployment rate falls in a signi￿cant
order of magnitude in any case. Consequently, the welfare e⁄ects are pushed
up in all speci￿cations as the lower unemployment rate reduces the negative
e⁄ect on utility of the increase in employment. The short-run beggar-thyself
e⁄ect does not vanish but falls while welfare in terms of the discounted present
value turns positive for smaller values of the cross-country substitutability
￿ than in the benchmark model. Most notably, the increase in welfare is
signi￿cant for all speci￿cations.
Summing up, taking account of a feedback e⁄ect of unemployment on
the disutility of labor alters the welfare impact of an expansionary monetary
policy shock in an open economy (and, of course, in a closed economy as
well) as the e⁄ect on welfare by the large increase in employment due to the
real interest rate e⁄ect and the expenditure switching e⁄ect relative to the
increase in consumption is muted. The range of values of the cross-country
substitutability for which overall welfare actually increases, i.e. where a
beggar-thyself e⁄ect is avoided, is enlarged.
4.3 Robustness Analysis
As the strict link between unemployment and employment and thereby unem-
ployment and output falls when the preference shifter is included, a natural
question that arises is if it makes a di⁄erence whether output or unemploy-
ment is targeted by the central bank￿ s Taylor rule. And indeed, after the
expansionary monetary policy shock, unemployment falls less than output
increases when the shifter is included. Consequently, the reduction of the
interest rate and the terms of trade is larger and the increase in output big-
ger if unemployment is included in the Taylor rule instead of output (with
opposite sign).12
12Results are available upon request.
285 Conclusions
My main ￿nding is that taking account of e⁄ects of unemployment on workers
well-being who are not unemployment themselves, which is motivated by the
￿ndings of L￿chinger, Meier and Stutzer (2010), improves the empirical ￿t of
the New Keynesian model in an important dimension. The counter factual
wealth e⁄ect in response to monetary policy shocks is shut down: The labor
force grows after an expansionary monetary policy shock in line with the
empirical ￿nding of Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2010). Furthermore,
the welfare implications of such shocks are considerably changed in that an
expansionary shock has a much more bene￿cial e⁄ect on welfare because the
fall of the unemployment rate increases employed workers￿utility.
A drawback of the present model is certainly the risk sharing within
families. Unemployment does not change consumption relative to employed
family members but improves relative utility as the disutility of work is zero.
However, improving the model in this respect would make the argument
made here even stronger as the negative welfare e⁄ects of unemployment
would increase. The negative welfare e⁄ects of the present analyses can thus
be regarded as a lower bound of such e⁄ects.
The present framework allows explorations into a few other important
directions which are subject of related research. First, the model allows for
di⁄erent spillover e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks on other country￿ s unem-
ployment. Depending on the parameterization of the cross-country elasticity
of substitution, the foreign unemployment rate can fall or increase. Policy
makers are often concerned about expansionary interest rate decisions in the
United States on their own country￿ s unemployment rate and usually point to
adverse expenditure switching and beggar-thy-neighbour e⁄ects. In a related
paper I shed light on this question in an empirical analysis for G7 countries
employing vector autoregressions.
Second, the optimal endogenous response of central banks to various
shocks may be considerably altered when unemployment a⁄ects welfare. In
particular, the optimal reaction to a an increase in unemployment is likely
to be a lot more aggressive than in standard models.
Third, modern welfare states imply considerable ￿scal costs of unemploy-
ment. Between 1991 and 2010 the annual German social security expen-
ditures ("Sozialversicherungsausgaben") and the unemployment rate had a
correlation coe¢ cient of 0.67. These expenditures are usually associated with
distortionary taxes and social security contributions. These distortions in-
crease with unemployment causing a considerable burden for society. Taking
account of such e⁄ects might change the optimal policy mix in response to
an increase in unemployment.
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32A Appendix
A.1 Fluctuations of ￿
p
t around the symmetric steady
state of order 1 are zero.
We need to show that a ￿rst order Taylor approximation of ￿
p
t around a


































(b yt(z) ￿ b yt)













b yt(z)dz ￿ b yt
￿
So we need to show that
Z 1
n
b yt(z)dz = b yt. In order to derive this equality




















































This convenient equality between the level of output at the ￿rm level Y (z)
and aggregate per-capita output Y follows because the size of the economy
measured in terms of the number of ￿rms equals the size of the economy
measured in terms of households. As a consequence, aggregation over all




















































This veri￿es the claim stated above.








































Subtracting (17) and plugging b yt+kjt(z) into b yt+k, we get





















































































As this relation is valid for all ￿rms having re-set their price in t and because
the the steady state y(z) = y and ph(z) = ph we can write
yt+kjt ￿ yt+k = ￿￿
￿
p
ho
t ￿ p
h
t+k
￿
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